US intervention in Iran (1951-1953) by Fatalski, Marcin
Marcin Fatalski 
US Intervention in Iran (1951–1953) 
The short period of time in which Iran was governed by the National Front and its 
leader, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, played a significant role in the modern 
history of Iran. In the process of the dramatic political changes that took place during 
this period, British influences in Iran were annihilated. The fall of Mossadegh – a 
consequence of a coup d’etat inspired and organized by the United States, initiated the 
over two-decade-long period of the “client state” governed by the last Shah of Iran.1 
The end of this process was brought about finally by the Islamic revolution in 1979.  
The crucial role in the coup was played by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
which, in cooperation with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), successfully 
carried out the first operation of ousting a foreign government. The Iranian public was 
aware of US involvement in the oust of Mosaddegh and the restitution of Shah 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. This contributed considerably to the anti-American 
sentiment in modern Iran and was utilized both by nationalists and the Islamic 
opposition in the political struggle preceding the fall of the Shah. However, in the U.S. 
this situation wasn’t widely discussed, at least until the 70s, when various activities of 
the CIA became the subject of Congress investigations and public debate. At the end of 
the 70s, the memoirs of leading CIA operation participants were published.2 In recent 
years, people studying this issue have been able to gain a deeper understanding of the 
developments which took place in Iran in 1951–1953. The nature of the “Ajax” 
operation was outlined by the “New York Times”, which published on its website the 
secret report prepared for the Agency by Donald Wilber (one of the operation 
participants).3 The nearly 200-page-long study offers details of the operation prepared 
by American and British secret agencies working in cooperation with the royalist plot 
in Iran. According to Mark Gasiorowski, the Middle East affairs specialist, the CIA’s 
story adds considerably to the knowledge of this coup d’etat.4  
What is significant is that the publication of the document was preceded by a 
statement by U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Madelaine Albright, who admitted (without 
apology) that: 
In 1953, the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of 
Iran’s popular Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. The Eisenhower Administration 
believed the actions were justified for strategic reasons, but the coup was clearly a 
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setback for Iran’s political development and it is easy to see how many Iranians 
continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.5  
The dramatic outbreak of nationalism in Iran was part of an overall process taking 
place at that time in the Third World. The position of colonial empires, especially 
Great Britain, was considerably undermined by nationalist and social movements 
aiming to remove foreign influence. In Iran, the program of democratization and 
liquidation of British hegemony was propagated by the National Front, a political 
movement created in 1949. In the atmosphere of political turmoil, under the banner of 
democracy and sovereignty, the nationalization of oil resources was also demanded.6  
The extraction and selling of Iranian oil remained, in accordance with the 
concession of 1901, in the power of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), most of 
whose stock was owned by the British government.7 Despite growing opposition in 
Iran, chiefs of the AIOC weren’t inclined to make concessions and such a position was 
fully accepted on Downing Street. The situation was still worsening but, as one U.S. 
diplomat stated, the British “didn’t seem to realize that the world had changed.”8  
The leading person of the National Front was Mohammad Mossadegh. Well- 
educated, with an aristocratic background, Mossadegh was raised in a family actively 
involved in public affairs. Mossadegh began his political activity early and also began 
paying the price for his pro-democratic, anti-Shah political convictions. He considered 
releasing Iran from the British as his basic political aim, as his mission. He advocated 
that nationalization of Iranian oil was the primary step on the way to regaining full 
sovereignty for his country.9 The nationalization of oil was put forward also by other 
political parties, such as the communist Tudeh Party, whose position became very 
strong at the end of the 40s.10  
Under huge pressure, Shah Mohammad Reza appointed the charismatic leader of 
the National Front as Prime Minister. Young and politically inexperienced, Reza was 
too weak to restrain the growing wave of Iranian nationalism. In a short time before the 
nomination of Mossadegh, 15 March 1951, the Iranian parliament made the decision to 
nationalize oil. The British government protested and turned to the International Court 
of Justice with an arbitrary plea. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden tried to 
belittle Mossadegh (“Old Mossy”) and the nationalization of oil in his memoirs.11 But 
in fact the nationalization of the AIOC was a great blow for the UK. Only in 1950 did 
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the British receive from the company 142 million dollars by way of taxes and other 
dues. In light of the fact that the annual trade deficit was about one billion dollars, the 
loss of oil revenues must have been considered huge.12 
The U.S. administration observed dangers which might result from the stiff position 
of the AIOC and British government. Americans were concerned that Iran may be 
involved in the Russian sphere of influence. Iran, as a strategically located and oil-
reach country, had great importance in the time of the Cold War. Despite the rather 
commonly accepted opinion that Iranian oil was a crucial motive of U.S. activity,13 at 
this juncture of the Cold War it was not the most important question.14 For the U.S. 
administration it was crucial not to have Iran in the USSR’s area of influence because 
of the threat of a domino effect. Dean Acheson, as the Under Secretary in the Truman 
administration, expressed the conviction that overtaking of power by communists in 
such countries as Greece, Turkey or Iran might result in the fall of the democratic 
regimes of Western Europe.15 The U.S. administration assumed that, since the only 
option for Mossadegh was a communist regime, his government deserved help in order 
to stabilize Iran. It was not without significance that the U.S.A., under the democratic 
administrations of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman, strongly supported the 
idea of decolonization. Thus, the U.S.A. became the ally of Mossadegh’s regime and 
opposed the British position in this conflict. The U.S. tried to work out a solution to the 
Anglo-Iranian controversy; in July, 1951 Averell Harriman, the “professional” envoy 
of the Roosevelt era, paid a visit to the Middle East region and developed very good 
relations with Mossadegh, but his mission appeared to be unsuccessful.16 In response to 
the nationalization of oil and military seizure of the Abadan refinery by the Iranians, 
British authorities withdrew technical personnel and successfully stopped the 
production of oil. London also warned that legal steps would be undertaken against 
every country which bought Iranian oil. The position of the British government was 
unanimously supported by oil companies.17 For technical reasons, the Iranian 
government was unable to resume production, and this caused the deterioration of the 
economic situation in the country. Revenues from oil export decreased from $400 
million in 1950 to less than 2 million in the period from June 1951 to August 1953.18 
Moreover, there was no clear perspective of a solution. The British, as Anthony Eden 
stated in the conversation with Acheson, could not agree on the confiscation without 
compensation.19 The British didn’t make a mistake in their judgement that for their 
interests in Iran anyone would be an improvement over Mossadegh. The Iranian prime 
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minister – an Anglophobe – was determined to dismantle the British net of influence.20 
John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration, made an 
apt comment that Mossadegh would be satisfied only if London gave in.21 Despite the 
worsening economic situation of Iran, the political influence of Mossadegh was still 
growing in the whole region, since he was seen as a hero who challenged the British 
Empire. But the prime minister had completely different publicity in the West. 
Mossadegh was named by “Time” magazine “The Man of the Year” in 1951. “(…) the 
old nobleman,” “Time” wrote, “became the most world-renowned man his ancient race 
had produced for centuries”. But it was not good fame, because “he increased the 
danger of a general war among nations, impoverished his country and brought it and 
some neighboring lands to the very brink of disaster.”22  
The position of Washington toward the Iranian stalemate evolved in the years 
1951–1952 and the crucial change was brought about by the 1951 elections, when the 
Republicans came to power in the White House. The new administration of Dwight 
David Eisenhower, with John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, faced the necessity of 
working out its own policy toward Iran. Initially, the new U.S. leadership assumed that 
no alternative for Mossadegh existed. Dulles was deeply disappointed by the passive 
attitude of the Shah and predicted a dictatorship by Mossadegh with reluctance. He 
considered the possible fall of that government an open invitation to a communist coup 
d’etat in Iran, which would be a worse scenario for Washington.23  
For Dulles there was no doubt that Moscow desired to control Iran. Worse still, the 
Secretary saw little room for any action to be taken by the U.S. administration. He 
judged that the U.S. by its policy might only gain time, and the question was “what to 
do with the time thus gained, in view of the apparent hoplessness of Iran’s ultimate 
fate.” Dulles believed that U.S policy should be “disassociated” from the British 
because then this policy might be effective.24 He even put under the president’s 
consideration the purchasing of oil from Iran and giving material support to 
Mossadegh’s government.25 This idea was presented to Sir Anthony Eden and, what 
should have been expected, was rejected.26 U.S. leaders agreed that the States could not 
be indifferent to developments in Iran. Eisenhower feared that the Soviets could make 
an effort to control Iran. In this case the U.S. must act decisively, otherwise it might 
“descend to the status of a second-rate power.” The president stated emphatically, “If I 
had $500,000,000 of money to spend in secret, I would get $100,000,000 of it to Iran 
right now.”27 
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The British were disappointed by the passivity of the Eisenhower administration. 
“He [Eisenhower] seemed to feel,” wrote Eden to Winston Churchill, who was resting 
in Jamaica, “that a rupture of relations between the United States and Iran would be 
intolerable and must be prevented at any price.”28 The Americans assured their British 
partners that they didn’t intend to purchase Iranian oil. Nevertheless, they indicated the 
need to supply Mossadegh with limited aid in order to maintain his government (“to 
keep Mosadeq barely afloat”) and prevent the communists from taking power.29 
According to Anthony Eden, the credit for the American obsession with a communist 
coup went to Mossadegh.30 But the same fear eventually caused the Americans to 
decide to overthrow the Iranian statesman. 
The Iranian prime minister rejected the next British proposal of a compromise and – 
in the face of serious economic troubles – turned to Washington with a request for 
economic help. He expected the Americans to buy oil “in substantial quantities” and to 
give Iran loans, which could be repaid in the form of oil supplies.31 Dulles excluded 
any purchases of Iranian oil, first of all taking British interest into consideration. But he 
still believed the U.S. should make an effort to support Mossadegh’s government.32  
The Iranian leader was determined to carry out his policy, but growing economic 
problems and subsequent political turmoil in Iran persuaded him to put pressure on the 
Eisenhower administration. The risky tactics of Mossadegh were based on an 
assumption that the U.S. would never allow Iran to unite with the USSR and the Soviet 
bloc countries. Mossadegh gave the United States an “ultimatum”: if the U.S. and 
Western democracies did not purchase oil from Iran, Teheran might decide to sell it to 
the “iron curtain” countries.33 Ambassador Loy Henderson warned Mossadegh that 
transactions with the Soviet bloc could only increase Iran’s difficulties, but the prime 
minister remained determined to continue his course and expected a quick reaction 
from U.S. leaders.34  
The tactics established by the head of the Iranian government appeared to be 
disastrous for him and his policy, because of the opinion of U.S. leaders that he was 
unable to guarantee that Iran would remain non-communist.35 Beside the fear of losing 
Iran to the Soviet sphere of influence, the position of the Eisenhower administration 
was due to other reasons. Washington couldn’t afford to support Mossadegh on his 
own terms, because it meant agreement to the nationalization of AIOC. This was 
                                                        
28 A. Eden, Full Circle, p. 212. 
29 “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom,” 7 March 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, 
vol. 10, p. 702.  
30 Head of the British diplomacy wrote: “…he [Eisenhower] seemed obsessed by the fear of a 
communist Iran. Musaddiq has evidently again scared the Americans”: A. Eden, op.cit., p. 212. 
31 “The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to Department of State,” 9 March 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, 
vol. 10, p. 704. 
32 “Memorandum of the Discussion at the 136th Meeting of NSC,” 11 March 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, 
vol. 10, pp. 712–713. “This question would be kept under constant review to see whether aid of this nature 
could be used effectively to diminish [the] possibility of [a] gradual loss of Iran to [the] free world” wrote 
Dulles to Ambassador Loy Henderson: “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran,” 13 March 1953, 
FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 10, p. 714.  
33 “The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to Department of State,” 18 March 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, 
vol. 10, p. 718. 
34 Ibidem. 
35 J.A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p. 81, 83. 
impossible for the United States because of its relations with its closest ally – Great 
Britain.  
The hope for American help failed. Mossadegh wrote to Eisenhower stressing 
Iran’s problems and possible consequences of further deterioration of the situation.36 
But the president remained silent for a while because in Washington a new solution 
was being discussed. The Americans were listening to the anti-Mossadegh opposition. 
The opponents, linked with the imperial court and the army, were seeking contact with 
Washington to gain support for a plan to oust Mossadegh and replace him with General 
Fazlollah Zahedi. Although U.S. authorities approached Zahedi initially with reserve, 
they eventually recognized him as helpful in removing the National Front from 
power.37  
In these circumstances the British proposal of joint action against Mossadegh met 
with a positive response in Washington. The British had already tried to arouse the 
interest of the U.S. intelligence service in 1951–1952. But the Deputy Director of 
Central Intelligence Allan Dulles and CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt, who was later to 
play a significant role in the Iranian coup, believed that Secretary Acheson favored 
Mossadegh. They had to wait until the Republican party gained power. The new 
Secretary of State was to be John Foster Dulles – Allen’s brother, whose nomination 
guaranteed the support of political leaders for CIA initiative.38 After Eisenhower took 
office, Dulles, as new CIA chief, was resolved to use the intelligence service actively 
to fight the world-wide communist threat.39 The operation in Iran was a consequence of 
this conviction, which was shared by other politicians of that administration. The 
President and the Secretary of State supported the idea of covert operations. Such 
secret, special operations meant various forms of inspiring and supporting subversive 
action against foreign governments and political parties. In the 50s, till the failure of 
the Bay of Pigs invasion, covert operations remained an effective tool of U.S. foreign 
policy (this period of time is even called the “golden age” of such action).40  
Among the intelligence officers who discussed the plan of a covert operation which 
aimed to oust Mossadegh were Christopher Montague Woodhouse from the British 
Secret Intelligence Service, and the above-mentioned Kermit Roosevelt, head of the 
CIA Near East and Africa Division.41 The plan was presented to the Secretary of State 
by Kermit Roosevelt. The ambassador to Iran consented to the idea, however 
reluctantly, for the fear that Mossadegh was unable or unwilling to stop communists.42 
A few days later Eisenhower answered Mossadegh’s letter by declaring no U.S. help 
until the Anglo-Iranian controversy was solved.43 In July, 1953, leaders of the U.S.A. 
and U.K. finally approved the operational plan (the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of 
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State, the Directors of the CIA and SIS, Prime Minister Churchill and President 
Eisenhower).44 John F. Dulles, according to the CIA’s suggestion, issued a statement in 
which he criticized Mossadegh and blamed him for the growth of a communist 
influence in Iran.45 This statement aimed to demonstrate officially the new approach of 
the U.S. towards Mossadegh’s government.  
However, U.S. authorities still couldn’t find anyone who might be a counterweight 
for the Iranian leader. In Washington, the Shah was considered a reasonable, 
predictable and pro-Western partner.46 However, U.S. diplomats saw him rather as a 
political puppet without real influence.47 In fact, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi hoped for 
the fall of Mossadegh, but for fear of losing his throne he avoided any action against 
the Prime Minister.48 The Shah approved the candidacy of Zahedi, although he noticed 
that the general was not an “intellectual giant.” Moreover, Zahedi was acceptable only 
if his government received “emergency financial as well as massive economic aid”.49  
In the fall of April, 1953, CIA officer Donald Wilber arrived in Nicosia where he 
discussed the details of the operation with SIS officer Norman Darbyshire.50 The 
counterparts came to the conclusion that in the case of a coup, the army would opt for 
the Shah and that “the operation must, if possible, be made to appear legal or quasi-
legal instead of an outright coup.”51 The next stage of preparations began in Beirut, 
where Kermit Roosevelt, Wilber, and the head of the CIA station in Teheran, Roger 
Goiran, met. What was significant in their discussions was that Mossadegh personified 
the National Front; everyone agreed that an overthrow of the Prime Minister would 
completely disarm his followers.52 In Washington it was decided that the operation 
must be preceded by a clear declaration from the British government that they would 
be flexible in the oil question.53 Assurance came from the U.K. ambassador in 
Washington, Roger Mellor Makis, who promised the Americans that the British were 
ready to cooperate with a new Iranian government that would break with Mossadegh’s 
policy.54  
The covert operation began with a “psychological campaign” against Mossadegh, 
which entailed spreading negative propaganda, especially among religious circles, in 
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order to discredit the Prime Minister in public.55 The intelligence officers still awaited 
the full engagement of the Shah. But efforts undertaken by Ambassador Henderson, 
Princess Ashraf (the Shah’s twin sister) and other envoys failed. Among them was also 
General Norman Schwarzkopf (the father of a victorious commander-in-chief of the 
“Desert Storm” operation). As a former advisor of the Iranian gendarmerie, he enjoyed 
the Shah’s confidence.56 But the failure of his mission clearly showed the Shah’s lack 
of political self-confidence: Mohammad Reza wasn’t sure of his army’s loyalty, and 
still considered the constitutional methods of dismissing Mossadegh.57 Finally, 
following a meeting with Kermit Roosevelt, the Shah agreed to sign two royal decrees 
(firmans): one dismissing Mossadegh and one appointing Zahedi as Prime Minister. 
After doing so, in order to protect himself, Mohammad Reza left for Ramsar – a royal 
resort on the Caspian Sea.58  
The firmans were to be delivered to Mossadegh by Col. Nematollah Nassiri (later 
head of SAVAK – the secret police of Mohammad Reza) on 15 August, 1953. But the 
Prime Minister somehow had received information about the conspiracy and Nassiri 
was arrested. It is still not known how Mossadegh was informed of the secret 
preparations. Wilber wrote only about the “indiscretion of one of the Iranian Army 
officer–participants.”59 The army officers participating in the plot remained passive and 
Mossadegh’s forces quickly arrested many people involved.  
The next day, 16 August, the U.S. embassy made known that the Iranian 
government had brought the situation under control.60 The Shah didn’t keep his cool 
and took shelter in Egypt. But Roosevelt still believed in ultimate success. First of all, 
he intended to convince Iranians that Zahedi was the only legal head of government. 
To achieve this, he passed on to the Associated Press some “unofficial” information 
that “plotters” owned the Shah’s decrees dismissing Mossadegh. The CIA organized a 
meeting of “New York Times” reporters and Zahedi’s son, who gave them photocopies 
of the decrees naming the general as prime minister. The CIA also prepared a special 
public statement from Zahedi, which was distributed in Teheran (like the later 
fabricated interview with the general).61 
Political leaders in Washington and London had no clear concept what steps should 
be taken. There were opinions that the U.S.A. should look for an agreement with 
Mossadegh, even at the cost of British interests in the Middle East.62 The Shah finally 
realized that he could not return to an Iran ruled by the National Front and therefore 
officially supported the plot, saying that what had occurred in Iran “cannot be 
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considered coup d’etat in the real sense.”63 Kermit Roosevelt continued the operation 
in Teheran; Allen Dulles was in Europe at that time, and thus could not affect the 
developments in Iran. The Director of the CIA stayed in Rome where the Shah also 
arrived from Baghdad, but it seems that they (despite both being involved in the plot) 
didn’t get in touch with each other.64  
Ambassador Henderson decided with Roosevelt that the second part of Operation 
Ajax would begin on 19 August. According to Roosevelt’s memoirs, they both 
concluded that when asked by Mossadegh about U.S. involvement in the coup, the 
Ambassador would lie. “I would make it quite plain,” said Henderson, “that we have 
no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of a friendly country.” “Diplomats are 
expected, if not required, to say such things,” concluded Roosevelt.65  
The second attempt to overthrow Mossadegh began with the publication by some 
newspapers of the decrees issued by the Shah with the nomination of Zahedi. News of 
this spread, and the Shah’s followers began to gather in the streets of Teheran. Donald 
Wilber stressed in his report that for the Iranians it was not a simple choice between 
Mossadegh and the Pahlavi dynasty. The main reason for their protest against the 
government was Tudeh party activity.66 In fact, the economic and social problems of 
Iran, with constant protests, rebellious acts and even political terrorism by Tudeh 
members, had become a source of people’s growing frustration. Mossadegh’s 
government, strongly engaged in political struggle, was unable to guarantee public 
order and manage the crisis successfully. In consequence, it lost control of the situation 
in the country. On 19 August, the CIA took advantage of the frustration and 
disappointment of the Iranians.  
The troops sent by Mossadegh to pacify the protesters fired shots over the heads of 
the crowd. “The crowds were not,” Wilber stressed, “as in earlier weeks, made up of 
hoodlums, but included people of all classes – many well-dressed…”67 Around 
midday, the army officers involved in the royal conspiracy and the “Ajax” operation 
took control over the demonstrations. The seizure of Radio Teheran by the plotters 
allowed them to announce information countrywide about the success of the royalists; 
the decrees of the Shah were read in order to legitimize the coup. Eventually, the Chief 
of Staff’s headquarters and Mossadegh’s house were also seized, and the Prime 
Minister was arrested.68 
Analyses of the political and diplomatic developments which anteceded the fall of 
the National Front leader lead to the conclusion that the United States played a decisive 
role in the overthrow of Mossadegh. By nationalizing the oil industry, Mossadegh’s 
government involved itself in a dramatic conflict with Great Britain. The parent state 
was losing its colonies but still remained one of the world’s main powers. However, 
the British appeared to be unable to oust Mossadegh in spite of numerous efforts which 
were undertaken in years 1951–1952.  
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Internal opposition in Iran was also incapable of diminishing the political position 
and influence of Mossadegh. Religious leaders lacked sufficient political support to 
win their struggle with the Prime Minister and his followers for the political leadership 
of the country.69 The Tudeh party was also unable to gain power, because of 
organizational weaknesses and lack of popular support. Even the CIA deemed that the 
possibility of a Tudeh coup was very slight before the end of 1953.70 Only the U.S. 
could intervene and successfully remove the leader of the Iranian government and the 
National Front.  
The coup d’etat inspired and organized by the U.S.A. made the restitution of the 
Shah’s reign possible. Mohammad Reza not only regained his throne but began the 
process of building an absolute monarchy. The “Ajax” operation symbolized a 
historical turn – the United States replaced Great Britain as the decisive power in the 
Middle East. When “Time” magazine announced John Foster Dulles as The Man of the 
Year 1954, it was a symbolic expression of these developments.  
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